The REAL History - Mother Of All Conspiracies http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html
5-20-1 "...everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to
the United States..." ARMY BOARD, 1944 President Roosevelt (FDR) provoked
the attack, knew about it in advance and covered up his failure to warn the
Hawaiian commanders. FDR needed the attack to sucker Hitler to declare war,
since the public and Congress were overwhelmingly against entering the war in
Europe. It was his backdoor to war.
FDR blinded the commanders at Pearl Harbor and set them up by - 1.denying
intelligence to Hawaii (HI) 2.on Nov 27, misleading the commanders into thinking
negotiations with Japan were continuing 3.having false information sent to HI
about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.
1904 - The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in
1932 - In The Grand Joint Army Navy Exercises the attacker, Admiral Yarnell,
attacked with 152 planes a half-hour before dawn 40 miles NE of Kahuku Point and
caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga
successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed
position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over
complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate
protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson
felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he
raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced.
His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June
7 Oct 1940 - Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an 8 point memo on how to force
Japan into war with US. Beginning the next day FDR began to put them into effect
and all 8 were eventually accomplished.
11 November 1940 - 21 aged British planes destroyed the Italian fleet, including
3 battleships, at their homeport in the harbor of Taranto in Southern Italy by
using technically innovative shallow-draft torpedoes.
11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila
to get into war. Navy Chief Stark objected: "I have previously opposed this
and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark
in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested (more forces to Manila) and the
question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint,
was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not
want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6." (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424)
March 1941 - FDR sold munitions and convoyed them to belligerents in Europe --
both acts of war and both violations of international law -- the Lend-Lease Act.
23 Jun 1941 - Advisor Harold Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day after Germany
invaded the Soviet Union, "There might develop from the embargoing of oil
to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get
into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought
in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic
Russia." FDR was pleased with Admiral Richmond Turner's report read July
22: "It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of
petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of Netherland East Indies...it
seems certain she would also include military action against the Philippine
Islands, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war." On July 24
FDR told the Volunteer Participation Committee, "If we had cut off the oil
off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and
you would have had war."
The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in US cutting off their main supply
of oil and forcing them into war with the US. Intelligence information was
withheld from Hawaii from this point forward.
14 August - After the Atlantic Conference, Churchill noted the "astonishing
depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war." Churchill cabled his cabinet
"(FDR) obviously was very determined that they should come in.".
18 October - diary entry by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes: "For a long
time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of
Purple Code - the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher which used automatic
telephone switches to separately and differently encipher each character sent.
It was cracked by the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men).
J-19 was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This columnar code was cracked.
JN-25 - The Japanese Fleet's Cryptographic System, a.k.a. 5 number code
JN stands for Japanese Navy, introduced 1 June 1939. This was a very simple
old-type code book system used by the American Army and Navy in 1898 and
abandoned in 1917 because it was insecure.
Version A has a dictionary of 5,600 numbers, words and phrases, each given as a
five figure number. These were super-enciphered by addition to random numbers
contained in a second code book. The dictionary was only changed once before PH
on Dec 1, 1940, to a slightly larger version B but the random book was changed
every 3 to 6 months- last on Aug 1. The Japanese blundered away the code when
they introduced JN25-B by continuing to use, for 2 months, random books that had
been previously solved by the Allies. That was the equivalent of handing over
the JN-25B codebook. It was child's play for the Navy group OP-20-G (738 men
whose primary responsibility was Japanese naval codes) to reconstruct the
exposed dictionary. We recovered the whole thing immediately - in 1994 the NSA
published that JN-25B was completely cracked in December 1940. In January 1941
the US gave Britain two JN-25B code books with keys and techniques for
deciphering. The entire Pearl Harbor scheme was laid out in this code.
The official US Navy statement on JN-25B is the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP HISTORY TO
WORLD WAR II prepared by Captain J. Holtwick in June 1971 who quotes Captain
Safford, the chief of OP-20-G, on page 398: "By 1 December 1941 we had the
code solved to a readable extent."
Churchill wrote "From the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital
Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large numbers of their military and
diplomatic telegrams."(GRAND ALLIANCE p 598) Safford reported that
during 1941 "The Navy COMINT team did a thorough job on the Japanese
Navy with no help from the Army."(SRH-149) " ... many pattern messages
could be read practically entire with as few as 1500 meanings." (NSA).
In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581 intercepted by US
between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA says "We know now that they
contained important details concerning the existence, organization, objective,
and even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force." (Parker p 21)
Of the over thousand radio messages sent by Tokyo to the attack fleet, only 20
are in the National Archives. All messages to the attack fleet were sent several
times, at least one message was sent every odd hour of the day and each had a
special serial number. Starting in early November 1941 when the attack fleet
assembled and started receiving radio messages, OP-20-G stayed open 24 hours a
day and the "First Team" of codebreakers worked on JN-25. In November
and early December 1941, OP-20-G spent 85 percent of its effort reading Japanese
Navy traffic, 12 percent on Japanese diplomatic traffic and 3 percent on German
naval codes. FDR was personally briefed twice a day on JN-25 traffic by his
aide, Captain John Beardell, and demanded to see the original raw messages in
English. The US Government refuses to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941
decrypts of JN-25 on the basis of national security, a half-century
after the war.
AD or Administrative Code wrongly called Admiralty Code was an old four
character transposition code used for personnel matters. No important messages
were sent in this weak code. Introduced Nov 1938, it was seldom used after Dec
Magic - http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html
the security designation given to all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages. It's
hard not to conclude with historians like Charles Bateson that "Magic
points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable
anybody could have failed to forecast the Japanese move." The NSA reached
the same conclusion in 1955.
Ultra - the security designation for military codes. No Pearl Harbor
investigation discussed Ultra even though on June 7, 1942 the Chicago Tribune
and six other newspapers betrayed the fact we were reading JN-25.
Warnings do no harm and might do inexpressible good 27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo
Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US
embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that
there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This
information was sent to the State Department and Naval Intelligence and to
Admiral Kimmel at Hawaii.
31 March 1941 - A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan
made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with
aircraft from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had
assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet
wherever it was. The fleet was the only threat to Japan's plans. Logically,
Japan couldn't engage in any major operation with the American fleet on its
The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.
10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy
secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake
Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor. July - The US Military Attache in
Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small
submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training
program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the
Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko
Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be
soon. The FBI told him that his information was "too precise, too complete
to be believed. The questionnaire plus the other information you brought spell
out in detail exactly where, when, how, and by whom we are to be attacked. If
anything, it sounds like a trap." He also reported that a senior Japanese
naval person had gone to Taranto to collect all secret data on the attack there
and that it was of utmost importance to them. The info was given to Naval IQ.
Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean People's League,
told Eric Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had
positive proof that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before
Christmas. Among other things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late
October, Haan finally convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were
planning to attack in December or January.
Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and FDR
24 September 1941, the " bomb plot" message in J-19 code from Japan
Naval Intelligence to Japan' s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of
exact locations of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo
pilots was deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships
in harbor, unless to attack them - it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans
Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based
on it prepared by Safford and others from being passed to Hawaii. The chief of
Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced because he insisted on warning HI.
It was lack of information like this that lead to the exoneration of the Hawaii
commanders and the blaming of Washington for unpreparedness for the attack by
the Army Board and Navy Court. At no time did the Japanese ever ask for a
similar bomb plot for any other American military installation. Why the
Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been
explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941
to allow it to continue. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief of 3rd
Bureau, Naval General Staff", marked Secret Intelligence message, and given
special serial numbers, so their significance couldn't be missed. There were
about 95 ships in port. The text was:
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This
area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves,
buoys and in docks.
(Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make
mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same
Simple traffic analysis of the accelerated frequency of messages from various
Japanese consuls gave a another identification of war preparations, from Aug-Dec
there were 6 messages from Seattle, 18 from Panama, 55 from Manila and 68 from
Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the greatest spy in history, informed
Kremlin that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him
that this was passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in
the War Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word confession to the Japanese were
deleted. NY Daily News, 17 May 1951.
16 Oct. - FDR grossly humiliated Japan's Ambassador and refused to meet with
Premier Konoye to engineer the war party, lead by General Tojo, into power in
1 Nov. - JN-25 Order to continue drills against anchored capital ships to
prepare to "ambush and completely destroy the US enemy." The message
included references to armor-piercing bombs and 'near surface torpedoes.'
13 Nov. - The German Ambassador to US, Dr. Thomsen an anti-Nazi, told OSS that
Pearl Harbor would be attacked.
14 Nov. - Japanese Merchant Marine was alerted that wartime recognition signals
would be in effect Dec 1.
22 Nov. - Tokyo said to Ambassador Nomura in Washington about extending the
deadline for negotiations to November 29: "...this time we mean it, that
the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically
going to happen." CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US was warned
in mid-November that the Japanese Fleet had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was
going to attack Pearl Harbor. FOIA #F-1998-00977.
23 Nov. - JN25 order - "The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on
X-day." (Tokyo time or 8 A.M. Honolulu time)
25 Nov. - British decrypted the Winds setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded
it Nov. 28. It was a J-19 Code message that there would be an attack and that
the signal would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report - rain meaning war,
east (Higashi) meaning US.
25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary "FDR stated that we
were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked:
"the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing
the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk
involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that
in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to
make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain
no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."
25 Nov. - Navy Department ordered all US trans-Pacific shipping to take the
southern route. PHH 12:317 ADM Turner testified "We sent the traffic down
to the Torres Straight, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be
clear of any traffic." PHH 4:1942
25 Nov. - Yamamoto gave this order in JN-25: " (a) The task force, keeping
its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and
aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of
hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii
and deal it a mortal blow. The raid is planned for dawn on X-day -- exact date
to be given by later order. (b) Should the negotiations with the US prove
successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return
and reassemble. (c) The task force will move out of Hitokappu Wan on the morning
of 26 November and advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4
December and speedily complete refueling." ( Order to sail - scan from the
PHA Congressional Hearings Report, vol 1 p 180, transcript p 437-8) This was
decoded by the British on November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. When it was
decoded by the US is a national secret, however, on November 26 Naval
Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an
unknown port ready for offensive action.
26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill sent an urgent secret message to FDR, probably
containing above message. This message caused the greatest agitation in DC. Of
Churchill's voluminous correspondence with FDR, this is the only message that
has not been released (on the grounds that it would damage national security).
Stark testified that "On November 26 there was received specific evidence
of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the
C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941, in his book THE
SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7, wrote "The British had sent word that a
Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." Washington, in an order of
Nov 26, ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington out
of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order included stripping
Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection.
In response to Churchill's message, FDR secretly cabled him that afternoon -
"Negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks." Note that
the only way FDR could have linked negotiations with service action, let alone
have known the timing of the action, was if he had the message to sail. In other
words, the only service action contingent on negotiations was Pearl Harbor.
26 Nov. - the "most fateful document " was Hull's ultimatum that Japan
must withdraw from Indochina and all China. FDR's Ambassador to Japan called
this "The document that touched the button that started the war."
27 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson sent a confused and confusing hostile action
or DO-DON'T warning. The Navy Court found this message directed attention away
from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One purpose of the message was to
mislead HI into believing negotiations were continuing. The Army which could not
do recon was ordered to and the Navy which could was ordered not to. The Army
was ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically precluded attention to outside
threat. Navy attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC repeated, no less
than three times as a direct instruction of the President, "The US desires
that Japan commit the first overt act Period." It was unusual that FDR
directed this warning, a routine matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew
other warnings were not sent. A simple question--what Japanese "overt
act" was FDR expecting at Pearl Harbor? He ordered sabotage prevented and
subs couldn't enter, that leaves air attack. The words "overt act"
disclose FDR's intent - not just that Japan be allowed to attack but that they
inflict damage on the fleet. This FDR order to allow a Japanese attack was aid
to the enemy - explicit treason.
29 Nov.- Hull sat in Layfayette Park across from the White House with ace United
Press reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating that Pearl Harbor would
be attacked on December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26 message from
Churchill. The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH report on page 13 under the
headline "Attack Was Expected" stated the US had known that Pearl
Harbor was going to be attacked the week before. Perhaps Leib wasn't the only
reporter Hull told.
29 Nov. - U.S. made a telephone intercept of an uncoded plain-text Japanese
conversation in which an Embassy functionary (Kurusu) asked 'Tell me, what zero
Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on diplomacy.' The voice from Tokyo (K.
Yamamoto) said softly, 'Well then, I will tell you. Zero hour is December 8
(Tokyo time, ie, December 7 US time) at Pearl Harbor'.
30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec. Tokyo time) - The Japanese fleet was radioed this
Imperial Naval Order (JN-25): "JAPAN, UNDER THE NECESSITY OF HER
SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE, HAS REACHED A POSITION TO DECLARE WAR ON THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." ( Congress Appendix D, p 415). US ally China
also recovered it in plain text from a shot-down Japanese Army plane near Canton
that evening. This caused an emergency Imperial Conference because they knew the
Chinese would give the information to GB and US. In a related J-19 message the
next day, the US translated elaborate instructions from Japan dealing in precise
detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia
"on the outbreak of war with England and the United States"
1 Dec. - Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San
Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the four
wireless news services and several shipping companies that they were getting
strange signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew the exact location of
the Japanese fleet because they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of
their ships pass (Layton p 261). This info was most likely given to them by US
because Sorge's spy ring was rolled up November 14. All long-range PBY patrols
from the Aleutians were ordered stopped on Dec 6 to prevent contact.
1 Dec. - Foreign Minister Togo cabled Washington Ambassador Nomura to continue
negotiations "to prevent the U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious."
1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the Striking Force in an
order intercepted Nov 14, radioed "proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20
E. Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December." (near HI) The fact that
this message is in the National Archives destroys the myth that the attack fleet
maintained radio silence. They were not ordered to (Order 820). Serial numbers
prove that the Striking Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16 and
Dec 7 or about 1 per hour. The NSA has not released any raw intercepts because
the headers would prove that the Striking Force did not maintain radio silence.
On Nov 29 the
Hiyei sent one message to the Commander of the 3rd fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi
sent several messages to its tankers - see page 474 of the Hewitt Report.
Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209) found over 100 messages from the Striking
Force in the National Archives. All Direction Finding reports from HI have been
crudely cut out.
Reports from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked up by
Station Cast, P.I. From traffic analysis, HI reported that the carrier force was
at sea and in the North.
Another site for Pearl Harbor research is