Pearl Harbor

The REAL History - Mother Of All Conspiracies http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html 5-20-1 "...everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States..." ARMY BOARD, 1944 President Roosevelt (FDR) provoked the attack, knew about it in advance and covered up his failure to warn the Hawaiian commanders. FDR needed the attack to sucker Hitler to declare war, since the public and Congress were overwhelmingly against entering the war in Europe. It was his backdoor to war.

FDR blinded the commanders at Pearl Harbor and set them up by - 1.denying intelligence to Hawaii (HI) 2.on Nov 27, misleading the commanders into thinking negotiations with Japan were continuing 3.having false information sent to HI about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.

BACKGROUND

1904 - The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in undeclared war.

1932 - In The Grand Joint Army Navy Exercises the attacker, Admiral Yarnell, attacked with 152 planes a half-hour before dawn 40 miles NE of Kahuku Point and caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.

1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.

1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate
protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.

7 Oct 1940 - Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an 8 point memo on how to force Japan into war with US. Beginning the next day FDR began to put them into effect and all 8 were eventually accomplished.

11 November 1940 - 21 aged British planes destroyed the Italian fleet, including 3 battleships, at their homeport in the harbor of Taranto in Southern Italy by using technically innovative shallow-draft torpedoes.

11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into war. Navy Chief Stark objected: "I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested (more forces to Manila) and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6." (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424)

March 1941 - FDR sold munitions and convoyed them to belligerents in Europe -- both acts of war and both violations of international law -- the Lend-Lease Act.

23 Jun 1941 - Advisor Harold Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, "There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia." FDR was pleased with Admiral Richmond Turner's report read July 22: "It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of Netherland East Indies...it seems certain she would also include military action against the Philippine Islands, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war." On July 24 FDR told the Volunteer Participation Committee, "If we had cut off the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war." 
The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in US cutting off their main supply of oil and forcing them into war with the US. Intelligence information was withheld from Hawaii from this point forward.

14 August - After the Atlantic Conference, Churchill noted the "astonishing depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war." Churchill cabled his cabinet "(FDR) obviously was very determined that they should come in.".

18 October - diary entry by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."

CODES

Purple Code - the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher which used automatic telephone switches to separately and differently encipher each character sent. It was cracked by the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men).

J-19 was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This columnar code was cracked.

JN-25 - The Japanese Fleet's Cryptographic System, a.k.a. 5 number code (Sample).
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/jn25b.gif JN stands for Japanese Navy, introduced 1 June 1939. This was a very simple old-type code book system used by the American Army and Navy in 1898 and abandoned in 1917 because it was insecure.

Version A has a dictionary of 5,600 numbers, words and phrases, each given as a five figure number. These were super-enciphered by addition to random numbers contained in a second code book. The dictionary was only changed once before PH on Dec 1, 1940, to a slightly larger version B but the random book was changed every 3 to 6 months- last on Aug 1. The Japanese blundered away the code when they introduced JN25-B by continuing to use, for 2 months, random books that had been previously solved by the Allies. That was the equivalent of handing over the JN-25B codebook. It was child's play for the Navy group OP-20-G (738 men whose primary responsibility was Japanese naval codes) to reconstruct the exposed dictionary. We recovered the whole thing immediately - in 1994 the NSA published that JN-25B was completely cracked in December 1940. In January 1941 the US gave Britain two JN-25B code books with keys and techniques for deciphering. The entire Pearl Harbor scheme was laid out in this code.

The official US Navy statement on JN-25B is the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II prepared by Captain J. Holtwick in June 1971 who quotes Captain Safford, the chief of OP-20-G, on page 398: "By 1 December 1941 we had the code solved to a readable extent."

Churchill wrote "From the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large numbers of their military and diplomatic telegrams."(GRAND ALLIANCE p 598) Safford reported that during  1941 "The Navy COMINT team did a thorough job on the Japanese Navy with no help from the Army."(SRH-149) " ... many pattern messages could be read practically entire with as few as 1500 meanings." (NSA).

In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581 intercepted by US between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA says "We know now that they contained important details concerning the existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force." (Parker p 21) Of the over thousand radio messages sent by Tokyo to the attack fleet, only 20 are in the National Archives. All messages to the attack fleet were sent several times, at least one message was sent every odd hour of the day and each had a special serial number. Starting in early November 1941 when the attack fleet assembled and started receiving radio messages, OP-20-G stayed open 24 hours a day and the "First Team" of codebreakers worked on JN-25. In November and early December 1941, OP-20-G spent 85 percent of its effort reading Japanese Navy traffic, 12 percent on Japanese diplomatic traffic and 3 percent on German naval codes. FDR was personally briefed twice a day on JN-25 traffic by his
aide, Captain John Beardell, and demanded to see the original raw messages in English. The US Government refuses to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941 decrypts of JN-25 on the basis of national security, a half-century
after the war.

AD or Administrative Code wrongly called Admiralty Code was an old four character transposition code used for personnel matters. No important messages were sent in this weak code. Introduced Nov 1938, it was seldom used after Dec 1940.

Magic - http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html the security designation given to all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages. It's hard not to conclude with historians like Charles Bateson that "Magic standing alone
points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable anybody could have failed to forecast the Japanese move." The NSA reached the same conclusion in 1955.

Ultra - the security designation for military codes. No Pearl Harbor investigation discussed Ultra even though on June 7, 1942 the Chicago Tribune and six other newspapers betrayed the fact we were reading JN-25.

WARNINGS

Warnings do no harm and might do inexpressible good 27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that
there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This information was sent to the State Department and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel at Hawaii.

31 March 1941 - A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had
assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was. The fleet was the only threat to Japan's plans. Logically, Japan couldn't engage in any major operation with the American fleet on its flank.
The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.

10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor. July - The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.

10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI told him that his information was "too precise, too complete to be believed. The questionnaire plus the other information you brought spell out in detail exactly where, when, how, and by whom we are to be attacked. If anything, it sounds like a trap." He also reported that a senior Japanese naval person had gone to Taranto to collect all secret data on the attack there and that it was of utmost importance to them. The info was given to Naval IQ. Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean People's League, told Eric Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had positive proof that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among other things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October, Haan finally convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning to attack in December or January.
Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and FDR personally.

24 September 1941, the " bomb plot" message in J-19 code from Japan Naval Intelligence to Japan' s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships in harbor, unless to attack them - it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based on it prepared by Safford and others from being passed to Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced because he insisted on warning HI. It was lack of information like this that lead to the exoneration of the Hawaii commanders and the blaming of Washington for unpreparedness for the attack by the Army Board and Navy Court. At no time did the Japanese ever ask for a similar bomb plot for any other American military installation. Why the Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941 to allow it to continue. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief of 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff", marked Secret Intelligence message, and given special serial numbers, so their significance couldn't be missed. There were about 95 ships in port. The text was:

"Strictly secret.

"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as
possible:

"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) 
"Area C. East Loch. 
"Area D. Middle Loch. 
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.

"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks.
(Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"

Simple traffic analysis of the accelerated frequency of messages from various Japanese consuls gave a another identification of war preparations, from Aug-Dec there were 6 messages from Seattle, 18 from Panama, 55 from Manila and 68 from Hawaii.

Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the greatest spy in history, informed Kremlin that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this was passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in the War Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word confession to the Japanese were deleted. NY Daily News, 17 May 1951.

16 Oct. - FDR grossly humiliated Japan's Ambassador and refused to meet with Premier Konoye to engineer the war party, lead by General Tojo, into power in Japan.

1 Nov. - JN-25 Order to continue drills against anchored capital ships to prepare to "ambush and completely destroy the US enemy." The message included references to armor-piercing bombs and 'near surface torpedoes.'

13 Nov. - The German Ambassador to US, Dr. Thomsen an anti-Nazi, told OSS that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.

14 Nov. - Japanese Merchant Marine was alerted that wartime recognition signals would be in effect Dec 1.

22 Nov. - Tokyo said to Ambassador Nomura in Washington about extending the deadline for negotiations to November 29: "...this time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen." CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US was warned in mid-November that the Japanese Fleet had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to attack Pearl Harbor. FOIA #F-1998-00977.

23 Nov. - JN25 order - "The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-day." (Tokyo time or 8 A.M. Honolulu time)

25 Nov. - British decrypted the Winds setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded it Nov. 28. It was a J-19 Code message that there would be an attack and that the signal would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report - rain meaning war, east (Higashi) meaning US.

25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary "FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked: "the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."

25 Nov. - Navy Department ordered all US trans-Pacific shipping to take the southern route. PHH 12:317 ADM Turner testified "We sent the traffic down to the Torres Straight, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic." PHH 4:1942

25 Nov. - Yamamoto gave this order in JN-25: " (a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The raid is planned for dawn on X-day -- exact date to be given by later order. (b) Should the negotiations with the US prove successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble. (c) The task force will move out of Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4 December and speedily complete refueling." ( Order to sail - scan from the PHA Congressional Hearings Report, vol 1 p 180, transcript p 437-8) This was decoded by the British on November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. When it was decoded by the US is a national secret, however, on November 26 Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.

26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill sent an urgent secret message to FDR, probably containing above message. This message caused the greatest agitation in DC. Of Churchill's voluminous correspondence with FDR, this is the only message that has not been released (on the grounds that it would damage national security). Stark testified that "On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States." 
C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941, in his book THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7, wrote "The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." Washington, in an order of Nov 26, ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. In response to Churchill's message, FDR secretly cabled him that afternoon - "Negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks." Note that the only way FDR could have linked negotiations with service action, let alone have known the timing of the action, was if he had the message to sail. In other words, the only service action contingent on negotiations was Pearl Harbor.

26 Nov. - the "most fateful document " was Hull's ultimatum that Japan must withdraw from Indochina and all China. FDR's Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched the button that started the war."
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/hullno26.html

27 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson sent a confused and confusing hostile action possible
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/warnings.html or DO-DON'T warning. The Navy Court found this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One purpose of the message was to mislead HI into believing negotiations were continuing. The Army which could not do recon was ordered to and the Navy which could was ordered not to. The Army was ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically precluded attention to outside threat. Navy attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC repeated, no less than three times as a direct instruction of the President, "The US desires that Japan commit the first overt act Period." It was unusual that FDR directed this warning, a routine matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew other warnings were not sent. A simple question--what Japanese "overt act" was FDR expecting at Pearl Harbor? He ordered sabotage prevented and subs couldn't enter, that leaves air attack. The words "overt act" disclose FDR's intent - not just that Japan be allowed to attack but that they inflict damage on the fleet. This FDR order to allow a Japanese attack was aid to the enemy - explicit treason.

29 Nov.- Hull sat in Layfayette Park across from the White House with ace United Press reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26 message from Churchill. The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH report on page 13 under the headline "Attack Was Expected" stated the US had known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked the week before. Perhaps Leib wasn't the only reporter Hull told.

29 Nov. - U.S. made a telephone intercept of an uncoded plain-text Japanese conversation in which an Embassy functionary (Kurusu) asked 'Tell me, what zero hour is.
Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on diplomacy.' The voice from Tokyo (K. Yamamoto) said softly, 'Well then, I will tell you. Zero hour is December 8 (Tokyo time, ie, December 7 US time) at Pearl Harbor'.

30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec. Tokyo time) - The Japanese fleet was radioed this Imperial Naval Order (JN-25): "JAPAN, UNDER THE NECESSITY OF HER SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE, HAS REACHED A POSITION TO DECLARE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." ( Congress Appendix D, p 415). US ally China also recovered it in plain text from a shot-down Japanese Army plane near Canton that evening. This caused an emergency Imperial Conference because they knew the Chinese would give the information to GB and US. In a related J-19 message the next day, the US translated elaborate instructions from Japan dealing in precise detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States"

1 Dec. - Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the four wireless news services and several shipping companies that they were getting strange signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew the exact location of the Japanese fleet because they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of their ships pass (Layton p 261). This info was most likely given to them by US because Sorge's spy ring was rolled up November 14. All long-range PBY patrols from the Aleutians were ordered stopped on Dec 6 to prevent contact.

1 Dec. - Foreign Minister Togo cabled Washington Ambassador Nomura to continue negotiations "to prevent the U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious."

1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the Striking Force in an order intercepted Nov 14, radioed "proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December." (near HI) The fact that this message is in the National Archives destroys the myth that the attack fleet maintained radio silence. They were not ordered to (Order 820). Serial numbers prove that the Striking Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16 and Dec 7 or about 1 per hour. The NSA has not released any raw intercepts because the headers would prove that the Striking Force did not maintain radio silence. On Nov 29 the
Hiyei sent one message to the Commander of the 3rd fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi sent several messages to its tankers - see page 474 of the Hewitt Report.
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/warnings.html
Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209) found over 100 messages from the Striking Force in the National Archives. All Direction Finding reports from HI have been crudely cut out.
Reports from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked up by Station Cast, P.I. From traffic analysis, HI reported that the carrier force was at sea and in the North. 

Another site for Pearl Harbor research is 
http://www.onlineschools.org/pearl-harbor-remembered/

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